Freemium Killer Apps: Business Model Competition and the performance of digital PC games on steam

As part of the Faculty Research Seminar, Joost Rietveld will be presenting a paper by himself and Joe N. Ploog (click here for full paper).

Abstract
The freemium business model recently gained rapid popularity. Freemium products rely on attracting a large user base for their success and therefore are “hit or miss”. Which freemium products are best positioned to attain superior performance, and under what conditions? We argue that freemium products that unlock strong product-level network effects, which are also released when the platform has a large installed base, have a higher probability of becoming a killer app than freemium products without these features or paid products with similar characteristics. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 9,700 games released on Steam, the market-leading distribution platform for digital PC games. Our results suggest that performance heterogeneity between and among competing business models is importantly associated with product and market-level contingencies.

If you are on the seminar mailing list, you will receive a Zoom invitation to the online seminar. If you wish to participate and are not yet on the seminar mailing list, please send an email to Henriett Kakonyi.